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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Maurice Anthony Staples appeals from the district court's orders 
relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of the 
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea 
to felony domestic battery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While arguing with his fiancee, Patsy Garcilazo, about allegations that he 
was cheating on her, Staples twisted Patsy's wrist and pushed her over a couch, 
causing her to hit her head on a coffee table. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic 
Battery Eval., pp.4-5.) Patsy followed Staples outside and asked him to return 
her house keys. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.3, 5.) Staples 
responded by grabbing Patsy's neck, strangling her and throwing her to the 
ground. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.3-5.) Patsy got up, took 
Staples' keys and ran inside her apartment. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery 
Eval., p.5.) Staples followed Patsy and again pushed her over the couch, then 
held a knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic 
Battery Eval., pp.5, 12-13.) Staples then left the apartment, but not before 
kicking and breaking the door. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.4-
6.) Patsy's five-year-old daughter was present when Staples threatened Patsy 
with the knife, and she saw Staples kick in the door. (Domestic Battery Eva I., 
pp.5-7.) 
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The state charged Staples with attempted strangulation, aggravated 
assault, domestic assault in the presence of a child and malicious injury to 
property. (R., pp.35-37.) Pursuant to plea agreement, the state amended the 
first count of the information to charge domestic battery with traumatic injury 
(felony domestic battery). (R., pp.65-66, 69-71.) Staples pied guilty to that 
charge and the state dismissed remaining counts. (R., pp.65-67, 90.) The court 
imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.88-94.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court suspended the balance of Staples' sentence and placed him on 
probation for nine years. (R., pp.104-09, 111-18.) 
Less than nine months later, in December 2009, Staples' probation officer 
prepared a report of violation, alleging that Staples had violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation by being removed from New Directions Aftercare for 
failing to attend required sessions, failing to enroll in a court-ordered domestic 
violence treatment program, being cited for driving without privileges in 
September 2009, failing to pay the costs of supervision, and changing 
residences without permission and without notifying his probation officer of his 
whereabouts in November 2009. (R., pp.137-40; see also R., pp.119-20 (Motion 
For Warrant For Probation Violation, filed Feb. 1, 2010).) Staples admitted to 
having violated his probation by being removed from New Directions Aftercare, 
failing to enroll in domestic violence treatment, and changing residences without 
permission, and the state dismissed the remaining allegations. (R., pp.144-45.) 
The district court revoked Staples' probation, ordered the underlying sentence 
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executed and retained jurisdiction a second time. (R., pp.147-52.) At the 
conclusion of the second retained jurisdiction period, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Staples' sentence executed. (R., pp.158-
62.) Staples filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the 
district court denied. (R., pp.163-65, 180-83.) Staples filed a notice of appeal 
timely only from the court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 
35 motion. (R., pp.166-69, 186-89.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Staples states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Staples due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Staples' I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency in light of new 
information indicating that his family is in need of his 
financial support? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Staples failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Staples failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, 
either by relinquishing jurisdiction or by denying Staples' Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to felony 
domestic battery? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Staples Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Staples filed a motion to augment 
with various items, including as-yet prepared transcripts of the April 19, 2010 
hearing at which Staples admitted to having violated his probation and the 
August 2, 2010 disposition hearing at which the district court revoked Staples' 
probation and ordered a second period of retained jurisdiction. (Motion To 
Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support 
Thereof (hereinafter "Motion To Augment"), filed July 14, 2011. 1) The Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Staples' motion to augment with the requested transcripts 
but granted the motion insofar as it sought augmentation of the record with 
documentary evidence submitted in connection with Staples' sentencing and his 
Rule 35 motion. (Order Augmenting The Record, filed September 6, 2011.) 
Staples now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the 
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
effectively denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's 
1 Staples filed a timely objection to the record in the district court (see Objection 
To The Record, filed June 9, 2011), but he withdrew that objection to pursue a 
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court whether the requested transcripts 
were necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal (see Motion For Leave 
To Withdraw Objection To The Record And Vacate Hearing, filed July 6, 2011; 
Motion To Augment, p.2). 
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brief, pp.4-13.) Staples has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional 
rights, however, because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts (of 
hearings held in connection with a prior probation violation) are even relevant to, 
much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court has 
jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Staples Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and 
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, 
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 
n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial 
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record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations 
omitted)); Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the 
record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the 
record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Staples "must present something more than 
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. 
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Staples has failed to carry this burden. 
Staples' appeal is timely only from the district court's January 10, 2011 
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction (R., pp.160-62), and its April 4, 2011 order 
denying Staples' Rule 35 motion (R., p.182). Staples argues that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of his 
April 2010 admit/deny hearing and his August 2010 disposition hearing 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-13), but he has failed to explain, much less demonstrate, 
how transcripts of those hearings are necessary to decide the only issues over 
which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that the 
district court had such transcripts either when it relinquished jurisdiction in 
January 2011 or when it denied Staples' Rule 35 motion in April 2011, nor is 
there any indication that the court relied upon anything said at the previous 
hearings as a basis for its decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Rule 35 
relief. Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the 
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district court in relation to the jurisdictional review and Rule 35 proceedings, they 
were never part of the record before the district court and are not properly 
considered for the first time on appeaL See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 
376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the 
issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the record 
made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial 
court"); also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80,896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 
1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and 
consider new evidence."). In short, Staples has failed to show how the 
requested transcripts of hearings held in connection with the disposition of his 
prior probation violations are relevant to any issue arising from the subsequent 
relinquishment of jurisdiction and the denial of Rule 35 relief, the only issues over 
which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Staples 
(Appellant's brief, p.10), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into 
execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons 
why Hanington does not support Staples' claim of entitlement to the requested 
transcripts. First, Staples' appeal is not timely from the district court's August 
2010 order revoking his probation and, as such, Staples cannot directly 
challenge the sentence that was ordered into execution following the period of 
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probation. Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the 
proposition that a merits-based review of a trial court's decision to order a 
sentence executed following either a period of probation or a period of retained 
jurisdiction requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of 
transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the contrary, 
the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented 
at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching 
its decision to revoke probation or relinquish jurisdiction, an appellant is not 
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the 
date probation was finally revoked or jurisdiction was relinquished. Mayer v. City 
of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily" where "part or all of the stenographic transcript ... will not be 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (citation and internal quotations 
omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may 
choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the 
transcripts does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what 
is unnecessary for adequate appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 
462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 (indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 
motion not entitled to transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which 
no evidence was presented). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review a trial court's 
decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Rule 35 relief, Staples has failed to 
9 
show that any such circumstances apply here. Staples has failed to point to 
anything in the record that would indicate that what happened at the April 2010 
admit/deny hearing and the August 2010 disposition hearing was considered or 
played any role in the court's decisions in January and April 2011, respectively, 
to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Staples' Rule 35 motion for reduction of his 
underlying sentence. As such, Staples has failed to show that such transcripts 
are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Staples claims that 
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or 
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove 
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, 
p.9.) He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and 
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the 
state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or 
frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.6; see also p.4 ("The only way a state can 
constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript 
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) No 
reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
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verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. 1st at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. 1st at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would 
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." 1st at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." kl 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. 1st at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. 1st at 194-95. also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
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the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the relinquishment of 
jurisdiction and the denial of Staples' Rule 35 motion in April and August 2011, 
respectively. The record related to the district court's decisions is already 
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before 
the appellate court. (See, ~. 5/29/08 PSI; 6/3/08 Domestic Battery Eval.; 
10/3/08 Mental Health Report; 2/25/09 APSI (prepared after first rider); R., 
pp.137-40 (12/29/09 Report Of Probation Violation); 7/12/10 PSI (updated PSI 
prepared in connection with probation violation proceedings); State's Exhibit A 
(letter from Staples to victim - only evidence presented at 8/2/10 probation 
violation disposition hearing (R., pp.147-148)); 11/12/10 APSI (prepared after 
second rider).) It is Staples' appellate burden to establish that the requested 
transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the 
court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion. The 
augmentations he sought, however, were of never before prepared transcripts of 
hearings held several months before the district court rendered the decisions that 
are at issue in this case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested 
transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district court in 
relation to the jurisdictional review and Rule 35 proceedings. Because Staples 
failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested 
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before 
12 
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate 
review, and Staples has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights.2 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Staples has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. 
Staples cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-11 (citing, ~. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the 
record that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Staples' 
request for transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Staples' motion 
would have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the 
transcripts. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation 
to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.AR. 30. 
Staples' motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, 
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even 
helpful in addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order 
2 As a component of his due process claim, Staples argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) 
Because, for the reasons already explained, Staples has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the 
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion, 
there is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived 
Staples of effective assistance of counsel on this appeal. 
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properly denied the motion to augment because Staples failed to make a 
showing that any appellant indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to 
augment the record as requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion 
to augment would have been granted had Staples been paying for the requested 
transcripts; the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Staples has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Staples' motion to augment was properly denied 
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for 
adequate review of the district court's decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and 
deny Staples' Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence. Because Staples 
has failed to show his due process and equal protection rights were implicated, 
much less violated, by the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show 
any basis for relief. 
11. 
Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
After Staples pied guilty to felony domestic battery, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.88-94.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court gave Staples the opportunity for probation (R, pp.104-09, 111-18), 
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but Staples squandered that opportunity within a matter of months by failing to 
attend required aftercare and domestic violence treatment programs and 
changing residences without notifying his probation officer, thus preventing his 
probation officer from supervising him for at least two months (R., pp.119-20, 
137-40, 144-45; 7/12/10 PSI, pp.1-2, 5-6). Despite Staples' demonstrated 
unwillingness or inability to comply with the terms of probation, or even to be 
supervised at all, the district court exercised leniency and retained jurisdiction a 
second time, thereby giving Staples a second opportunity to prove he was 
amenable to community supervision. (R., pp.147-52.) Rather than take 
advantage of that opportunity, Staples "consistently failed to program during his 
entire time at NICI," leading to a recommendation that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction. (11/12/10 APSI, p.5.) The district court followed that 
recommendation and relinquished jurisdiction, concluding that Staples was "not 
ready for probation." (1/3/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23; R., pp.158-62.) The court 
thereafter denied Staples' Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.163-
65, 180-83.) 
On appeal Staples argues that "[t]he district court's reliance on the APSl's 
relinquishment recommendation constituted error because it did not accurately 
reflect his performance while on his second rider." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) He 
also challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, contending the fixed portion of 
his sentence "is excessively harsh when it is viewed in light of [both] the new 
information" he provided with his motion and "the other mitigating factors" he 
claims are present in his case. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Staples has failed to 
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establish an abuse of discretion. A review of the record supports the district 
court's determination, following the second period of retained jurisdiction, that 
Staples was not an appropriate candidate for probation, and Staples failed to 
present any new evidence entitling him to a reduction of his underlying sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 
(1981 ); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 
1990). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Contrary to Staples' assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this case 
supports the district court's determination that Staples was not a suitable 
candidate for probation, particularly in light of Staples' history of violent behavior, 
his failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities and his abysmal 
performance during his second period of retained jurisdiction. 
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Staples is a violent individual. He was convicted of battery in 2005 and of 
carrying a concealed weapon in 2006. (5/29/08 PSI, p.4; 7/12/10 PSI, pp.3-4; 
Domestic Battery Eval., p.4.) Between November 2006 and July 2007, law 
enforcement responded on at least four separate occasions to reports of 
"Possible Domestic Disputes" between Staples and his then fiancee, Patsy 
Garcilazo. (5/29/08 PSI, pp.4-5; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.14-16.) As noted by 
the presentence investigator, "[a]rguments, pushing, name-calling and yelling 
[were] the common theme" of these calls. (5/29/08 PSI, pp.4-5.) The level of 
violence escalated significantly in December 2007, when Staples committed the 
instant offense. Specifically, after Patsy accused Staples of cheating on her, 
Staples shoved her over a couch, strangled her, threw her to the ground, held a 
knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery 
Eval., pp.3-6, 12-13.) Immediately thereafter, Staples picked up the juvenile 
female with whom Patsy had accused him of cheating and drove her to a friend's 
house where they hid from authorities for the next several days. (Domestic 
Battery Eval., pp.7, 11.) In an interview with police following his arrest, Staples 
claimed to have "blacked out" during the most recent incident with Patsy, but he 
"confessed to pushing her by her neck with one hand to get her to let go of him" 
and to threatening her with a kitchen knife. (Domestic Battery Eval., pp.12-13.) 
When asked why he did not hurt Patsy with the knife, Staples replied, "Heart. 
Her daughter was there." (Domestic Battery Eval., p.12.) 
In both a Domestic Battery Evaluation and Mental Health Report prepared 
for sentencing, two separate evaluators opined that Staples minimized the extent 
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of both his assaultive behaviors and his anger problems. (Domestic Battery 
Eval., pp.19-20; Mental Health Report, p.2.) The domestic battery evaluator 
characterized Staples as having "narcissistic traits," "poor control of over 
aggressive impulses," and a tendency to "overreact in proportion to perceived 
provocation." (Domestic Battery Eval., p.20.) The mental health evaluator 
likewise opined that Staples had poor insight and "problems managing anger and 
personality disorder issues." (Mental Health Report, pp. 2, 5; see also p.1 
(Staples' "impairment is the result of anger management problems and 
personality problems").) The domestic battery evaluator classified Staples as 
posing a "medium to high risk" to commit future acts of violence. (Domestic 
Battery Eval., p.19.) Contributing to this risk assessment were the facts that 
Staples "express[ed] little remorse" for his conduct, did "not appear motivated for 
treatment" and did "not believe he had a problem with anger management or 
domestic violence," despite his involvement in documented "recurrent episodes 
of domestic violence." (Domestic Battery Eval., p.19.) The mental health 
evaluator also assessed Staples as posing a "moderate risk" to reoffend, noting 
that "[w]ithout treatment especially in the area of anger management he is at risk 
of harming someone and ending up in Court system again." (Mental Health 
Report, p.5.) 
After reviewing the Domestic Battery Evaluation and Mental Health 
Report, the district court struck a balance between the need to protect society 
and the goal of rehabilitation by retaining jurisdiction and recommending that 
Staples receive anger management and cognitive based programming. (R., 
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pp.91-92.) Staples participated in and satisfactorily completed several courses, 
including "A New Direction," Stress Management and Anger Management, during 
his first period of retained jurisdiction, but not without incident. (2/25/09 APSI, 
pp.1-4.) The staff and NICI noted that "Staples received a total of one alternative 
sanction, four written warnings, and four verbal warnings" during his time at NICI, 
and that "[a]t least four of these corrective actions involved 'anger' in one form or 
another." (2/25/09 APSI, p.3.) Despite these disciplinary issues, Staples 
received a recommendation for probation following his first period of retained 
jurisdiction, but with the express caveat that he "continue anger management 
through a domestic violence class" upon his release. (2/24/09 APSI, p.6.) 
Consistent with NICl's recommendation, the district court placed Staples 
on probation with the requirement that he participate in all rehabilitative programs 
recommended by his probation officer, including anger management. (R., 
pp.104-09, 111-18.) Staples immediately violated the conditions of his probation 
by failing enroll in a 52- week domestic violence treatment program and by being 
removed from "New Directions Aftercare" for non-attendance. (R., pp.137-39.) 
He also absconded supervision. (R., pp.137-39.) Staples' probation officer 
recommended that Staples' sentence be executed, reporting: 
"Mr. Staples was a difficult case to supervise, as he made 
no consistent effort to stay in contact with his probation officers. 
He never reported an employer to us. He missed scheduled 
appointments with me, and when he did finally report for a 
scheduled appointment in September 2009, he drove to my office 
without a license and was again cited for DWP. This, however, 
was not his only law enforcement contact, he reported at least two 
other times of being in a car with a friend who was pulled over. 
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Mr. Staples never began his Domestic Violence class, but 
began engaging in a romantic relationship, without permission of 
his probation officers. Further, he failed his New Directions 
aftercare course, for failure to attend, which was offered to him, 
free of cost at the probation office. 
He then absconded in November 2009, having spent 7 
months on supervision, but only having 3 face to face contact[s] 
with his probation officer .... 
Mr. Staples was given the opportunity of a period of retained 
jurisdiction followed by probation. However, he has shown that left 
to his own devises, Mr. Staples continues to associate with persons 
involved in illegal activity, continues to drive without privileges, and 
failed to show motivation to gain employment or attend treatment, 
even when offered to him free of cost. His consistent lack of 
progress and overall inability to follow any of the requirements of 
society and the court order, lead me to recommend a period of 
incarceration. During this time he would be able to attend 
treatment such as cognitive self change." 
(7/12/10 PSI, pp.5-6.) The presentence investigator concurred with the 
probation officer's assessment, stating, "I do not feel Mr. Staples would be 
successful in the community as he does not have stable residence, employment, 
and the desire to comply with the terms of his probation." (7 /12/10 PSI, p.11.) 
Despite Staples' demonstrated unwillingness or inability to comply with the 
terms of probation, and despite the probation officer's and presentence 
investigator's recommendations for incarceration, the district court exercised 
leniency in retaining jurisdiction a second time to afford Staples the opportunity 
to prove his amenability to community supervision. (R., pp.147-52.) Staples 
utterly failed to take advantage of that opportunity, however, as he failed to 
complete three of the four programs in which he was enrolled, including anger 
management, and consistently "demonstrated himself as unwilling to correct his 
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criminal thinking or to follow up on treatment that would help him correct it." 
(11/12/10 APSI, pp.1, 3-5.) He amassed several informal sanctions during his 
second period of retained jurisdiction and, according to NICI staff, "displayed a 
significant deficit when it comes to showing an ability to learn from previous 
problems." (11/12/10 APSI, pp.2-3.) He walked out of class, had missing and 
incomplete assignments, "was not willing to participate in the group discussions" 
or "process sessions," and spent the "majority" of his class time "not engaged 
and appeared to be sleeping on occasion." (11/12/10 APSI, pp.2-3.) Staples 
"completed his Personal Life Portfolio and received a positive review in his work 
area." (11/12/10 APSI, p.5.) NICI staff determined, however, that those 
accomplishments did not outweigh Staples' "negative behavior" and his 
consistent, willful failure to program. (11/12/10 APSI, pp.3-5.) Ultimately, the 
staff concluded that Staples did "not demonstrate[] the necessary skills to 
facilitate his successful return to his community" and was "not an appropriate 
candidate for probation." (11/12/10 APSI, p.3.) In light of this information, the 
district court acted well within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. 
Staples argues on appeal that the district court erred in relying on the 
information contained in the APSI as the basis for its decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction, contending that the APSI "did not accurately reflect his performance 
while on his second rider." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Although given the 
opportunity, Staples did not submit a written statement in conjunction with or in 
response to the information contained in the APSI. (See 11/12/10 APSI, p.5.) 
He testified at the jurisdictional review hearing that some of his failure to program 
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was due to an issue with his contact lenses. (1/3/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-13.) As 
acknowledged by Staples on appeal, however, he specifically told NICI staff 
about the contact lens issue, and that information was contained in the APSI. 
(11/12/10 APSI, p.2.) That Staples believes the district court should have 
assigned more weight to that information does not render the APSl's portrayal of 
Staples' performance during his second period of retained jurisdiction inaccurate. 
The only other information pointed to by Staples to support his claim of 
inaccuracy in the APSI is his testimony that he performed several hours of 
community service that went unnoted by NICI staff in recommending to the court 
that it relinquish jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, p.16; 1/3/11 Tr., p.9, L.17 - p.10, 
L.2.) A log of Staples' community service hours is contained in the APSI, 
however (see NICI Community Service Hours log, attached to 11/12/10 APSI), 
as is an express recognition by NICI staff that Staples performed well and 
"received a positive review in his work area" (11/12/10 APSI, pp.4-5). Again, that 
the district court (and NICI staff) found that Staples' negative behavior and failure 
to program outweighed any positive strides he made during his second period of 
retained jurisdiction does not show that the information contained in the APSI 
was inaccurate. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Staples was not an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision. This conclusion is supported by Staples' history of violent behavior, 
the risk he presents to the community, and his continued resistance to treatment. 
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Given any reasonable view of the facts, Staples has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction. 
D. Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Staples did not appeal his underlying sentence. 
Therefore, to prevail on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion, Staples must "show that the sentence. is excessive 
in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court 
in support of the Rule 35 motion." l_Q_,_; see also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 
516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008) (absent the presentation of new evidence, an 
appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence). Staples has failed to satisfy his burden. 
The only "new" information Staples submitted in support of his Rule 35 
motion were his unsubstantiated assertions that the "mother of [his] children" had 
rheumatoid arthritis and needed help taking care of the kids; he planned to take 
and finish "more" anger management, domestic violence and parenting classes; 
and he had guaranteed employment at two restaurants in his community. (R., 
p.164; 3/21/11 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.5, p.14, Ls.10-16.) The district court 
considered this information and rejected it as a basis for reducing Staples' 
sentence, noting that Staples had "been given multiple opportunities, including 
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two riders" and a period of probation, and had failed to take advantage of the 
treatment opportunities offered to him. (3/21/11 Tr., p.14, L.21 -p.15, L.23.) 
The court noted, "[T]he fundamental issue remains the same; that he's not 
completed the domestic violence and anger management that he needs to do. 
And he didn't do well on the last rider where I would have thought he would have 
given every possible effort given what he was faced with." (3/21/11 Tr., p.15, 
Ls.6-12.) The district court's concern regarding Staples' failure to take 
advantage of treatment opportunities was well-founded, particularly since, as 
pointed out by the prosecutor, "the mother of [Staples'] children" referred to by 
Staples in his Rule 35 motion, is the victim in this case and is the same individual 
with whom Staples has a history of domestic violence and no contact order 
violations. (See3/21/11 Tr., p.12, L.15-p.13, L.4.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Staples failed to show through his "new" information that his 
sentence was excessive. Staples has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Staples' Rule 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence. 
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